Joel Press

Publications

"The Scientific Use of 'Representation' and 'Function': Avoiding Explanatory Vacuity"

forthcoming in Synthese (Final proofs submitted)

Abstract

Nearly all of the ways philosophers currently attempt to define the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function’ undermine the scientific application of those terms by rendering the scientific explanations in which they occur vacuous. Since this is unacceptable, we must develop analyses of these terms that avoid this vacuity.

Robert Cummins argues in this fashion in Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. He accuses 'use theories' of representational content of generating vacuous explanations, claims that nearly all current theories of representational content are use theories, and offers a non-use theory of representational content which avoids explanatory vacuity. One task I undertake in this article is to develop an alternative non-use theory which avoids an objection fatal to that theory.

My second task is to adapt Cummins’ argument to criticize most current analyses of ‘function,’ which undermine scientific explanation in an analogous way. Though Cummins does not explicitly argue in this manner, his own analysis of ‘function,’ by avoiding any appeal to use, avoids the explanatory vacuity to which they succumb. Consequently, I endorse Cummins’ notion of function.

However, although use theories fail as analyses of the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function,’ they can still make significant contributions to the sciences employing these terms. For, while philosophers seeking to define ‘representation’ and ‘function’ must avoid incorporating representational and functional uses into their definitions, scientists must still find a way to determine which representations and functions are being used. Suitably re-construed use theories of representation and function may in many cases assist them in this task.

“Physical Explanations and Biological Explanations, Empirical Laws and A Priori Laws”

forthcoming in Biology and Philosophy (Final proofs submitted)

Abstract

Philosophers intent upon characterizing the difference between physics and biology often seize upon the purported fact that physical explanations conform more closely to the covering law model than biological explanations. Central to this purported difference is the role of laws of nature in the explanations of these two sciences. However, I argue that, although certain important differences between physics and biology can be highlighted by differences between physical and biological explanations, these differences are not differences in the degree to which those explanations conform to the covering law model, which fits biology about as well as it does physics.

Papers in Progress

"Functional Analysis and the Meaning of Life"

Abstract

I hope in this paper to clarify, and partially resolve, the conflict between science and religion. The claims over which scientific and various religious worldviews can conflict can be usefully divided into two sorts. Claims of the first sort involve matters of value and purpose. The chief problem here is that there appears to be no room in the natural world, as revealed by science, for such esoteric items as ethical facts, purposes, and the like. Hence religious claims about the real existence of values and purposes seem at the very least unsupported by science, and perhaps undermined by it. The second sort of conflict involves claims of ontology. Religions often add to the ontology of science the existence of entities such as gods, angels, demons, souls, heaven, hell, or other abodes for the afterlife. In addition, religions sometimes subtract select bits of scientific ontology that are perceived as conflicting with religious orthodoxy.

The partial resolution I hope to effect here is to be achieved by defending an account that analyzes moral value and purpose in terms of functions, while remaining neutral between naturalized and religious positions on these subjects. The clarification will result once the issue of moral value and purpose is out of the way, and we see that all true conflict between science and religion is ontological.

However, despite the frequent apparent conflicts between religious and naturalistic accounts of moral value and purpose, I intend to avoid certain of the more popular methods of achieving reconciliation. First, I have no intention of denying that these apparent conflicts are real, for instance by following Stephen Jay Gould in asserting that science and religion belong to “non-overlapping magisteria.” Second, I also have no intention of embracing moral relativism, at least if by that term one means that moral propositions only have truth values relative to personal or cultural attitudes and/or conceptual schemes. Third, I will not be denying the reality of moral values. Fourth, although I will therefore be asserting that there are multiple, incompatible, real moral values, I intend to resist the idea that all but the most important of these values are merely ceteris paribus values, while only the most important are values “all things considered.” Fifth, and simultaneously, I will offer an account of moral values according to which these mutually inconsistent and equally real values can nevertheless be said to be differently ranked in importance. Sixth, I have no intention to accomplish any reconciliation at the expense of abandoning even one iota of the scientific worldview.

Future Research Projects

Professional Presentations

“What Leibniz Failed to See in Locke’s Conception of Space”

Annual Meeting of the History of Science Society – November, 2006

“What Leibniz Failed to See in Locke’s Conception of Space”

Department Colloquium at California University of Pennsylvania – October, 2006

“The Scientific Use of the Term ‘Representation’: Avoiding Explanatory Vacuity”

Department Colloquium at Indiana University of Pennsylvania – February, 2006

"The Easy Solution to the Problem of Explanatory Vacuity - Part I: Representations"

University of Washington Graduate Student Conference in Philosophy – October, 2005

"Physical Explanations and Biological Explanations, Empirical Laws and A Priori Laws"

Department Colloquium at the University of Arizona – September, 2005

"Representation, Isomorphism, and Mapping Rules"

Department Colloquium at the University of Arizona – November, 2004

“Division and Identity”

Department Colloquium at Northern Arizona University – April, 1999

Awards

Philosophy Department Fellowship, University of Arizona – Fall, 1999

Service

General Education Committee – Fall, 2007 - present

Institutional Research Board – Fall, 2006 - present

Responsible for Outcomes Assessment for Philosophy Department – Fall, 2006 - present

Assisted Alvin Goldman with NEH summer seminar on Social Epistemology – Summer, 2000

Academic Employment

Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, California University of Pennsylvania,

Fall 2006 - present

Faculty Associate, Department of Integrative Studies, Arizona State University West,

Fall 2005 - Spring 2006

Faculty Associate, Department of Philosophy, Arizona State University,

Intermittent, Fall 1999 - Fall 2005

Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona,

Fall 1999 - Spring 2005

Adjunct Faculty, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Mesa Community College,

Intermittent, Fall 1995 - Fall 2004

Lecturer (Full-Time), Department of Philosophy, Northern Arizona University,

Fall 1998 - Spring 1999

Adjunct Faculty, Department of English, Eastern Arizona College,

Spring 1998

Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department of Philosophy, Arizona State University,

Fall 1992 - Spring 1994

Teaching Experience

Statement of Teaching Methods and Interests

Student Comments

Philosophy of Science	Combined	Cal	UA	NAU	ASU	ASUW	MCC	EAC
Philosophy of Science	5		5
Traditions: Science and Inquiry	1		1
Science, Technology and Society	2	2
Epistemology	1	1
Logic
Symbolic Logic	1		1
Logic and Critical Thinking	9		3	2	3		1
Philosophy of Mind/Metaphysics
Personal Identity	2			2
Individuals: Mind and Self	1		1
Philosophy of Religion	2		2
Ethics
Business Ethics	4		2			2
Medical Ethics	3	1	2
Moral Dilemmas (Senior Level)	2					2
Introduction to Ethical Theory	6	5			1
Miscellaneous
Introduction to Philosophy	24	3	1	4	3	1	11	1
Psychology Research Methods	2		2
TOTAL	65	12	20	8	7	5	12	1

References

Dissertation Committee

Richard Healey

Philosophy Department

University of Arizona

Tucson, AZ 85721-0027

(520) 621-5045

rhealey@email.arizona.edu

Terry Horgan

Philosophy Department

University of Arizona

Tucson, AZ 85721-0027

(520) 621-5045

thorgan@email.arizona.edu

Joseph Tolliver

Philosophy Department

University of Arizona

Tucson, AZ 85721-0027

(520) 621-5045

tolliver@email.arizona.edu

Educational Employers

Chris Maloney

Philosophy Department

University of Arizona

Tucson, AZ 85721-0027

(520) 621-5045

maloney@email.arizona.edu

George Rudebusch

Philosophy Department

Northern Arizona University

Flagstaff, AZ 86011-6011

(928) 523-2648

George.Rudebusch@nau.edu

Brad Armendt

Philosophy Department

Arizona State University

Tempe, AZ 85287-4102

(480) 965-3394

armendt@asu.edu

Graduate Coursework

Philosophy of Science

Philosophy of Science (UofA, Jenann Ismael)

Philosophy of Biological Science (UofA, Richard Healey)

Philosophy of Physical Science: Special and General Relativity (UofA, Richard Healey)

Philosophy of Physical Science: Quantum Mechanics (UofA, Richard Healey)

Philosophy of Science: Theories as Models (UofA, Richard Healey)

Independent Study: Isaac Newton (ASU, Michael White)

Logic

Mathematical Logic (ASU, Michael White)

Mathematical Logic (UofA, Bill Ferris [Mathematics Dept.])

Modal Logic (ASU, G.W. Fitch)

Philosophy of Mind

Philosophy of Mind (UofA, Joseph Tolliver)

Consciousness (UofA, David Chalmers)

Simulation Theory and Folk Psychology (UofA, Alvin Goldman)

Metaphysics

Personal Identity (ASU, Steven Reynolds)

Freedom of the Will (ASU, Stewart Cohen and David Cowles)

Epistemology

Social Epistemology (UofA, Alvin Goldman)

Decision Theory and Cognition (UofA, John Pollock)

Probability and Degrees of Belief (ASU, Brad Armendt)

Ethics and Social/Political Philosophy

Environmental Ethics (ASU, Joan McGregor)

Equality (UofA, Thomas Christiano)

Meta-ethics (UofA, Mark van Roojen [visiting from University of Nebraska, Lincoln])

Philosophy of Constitutional Law (ASU, Joan McGregor)

History of Philosophy

Carnap and Quine (ASU, Richard Creath)

Frege (UofA, Robert M. Harnish)

Hume (UofA, David Owen)

Rationalism and Empiricism (UofA, Joseph Tolliver)

Aristotle (ASU, Michael White)